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Are We Approaching an Economic Singularity?  
Information Technology and the Future of Economic Growth 
 
William D. Nordhaus1 




What are the prospects for long-run economic growth? The present 
study looks at a recently launched hypothesis, which I label Singularity. 
The idea here is that rapid growth in computation and artificial 
intelligence will cross some boundary or Singularity after which 
economic growth will accelerate sharply as an ever-accelerating pace 
of improvements cascade through the economy. The paper develops a 
growth model that features Singularity and presents several tests of 
whether we are rapidly approaching Singularity. The key question for 
Singularity is the substitutability between information and 
conventional inputs. The tests suggest that the Singularity is not near. 
 
I. Introduction 
What are the prospects for long-run economic growth? One prominent line of 
economic thinking is the trend toward stagnation. Stagnationism has a long history 
in economics, beginning prominently with Malthus and surfacing occasionally in 
different guises. Prominent themes here are the following: Will economic growth 
slow and perhaps even reverse under the weight of resource depletion? Will 
overpopulation and diminishing returns lower living standards? Will unchecked CO2 
emissions lead to catastrophic changes in climate and ecosystems? Have we 
                                                        
1 The author is Sterling Professor of Economics; Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, CT 
06511, USA. Mailing address: P. O. Box 208268, Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06511-8268, USA. 




depleted the store of potential great inventions? Will the aging society lead to 
diminished innovativeness?2 
However, the present study looks at the opposite idea, a recently launched 
hypothesis which I label Singularity. The idea here is that rapid growth in 
computation and artificial intelligence will cross some boundary or Singularity, after 
which economic growth will accelerate sharply as an ever-increasing pace of 
improvements cascade through the economy. The most prominent exponents are 
computer scientists (see the next section for a discussion and references), but a soft 
version of this theory has recently been advanced by some economists as well 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014)   
At the outset, I want to emphasize that this is not a tract for or against 
Singularity. Rather, the purpose is two-fold. First, I lay out some of the history, 
current views, and show an analytical basis for rapidly rising economic growth. 
Next, I propose several diagnostic tests that might determine whether Singularity is 
occurring and apply these tests to recent economic behavior in the United States. In 
the end, I hope that the analysis and tests will allow us to keep a running scoreboard 
as to whether the economic universe is on a stagnationist or accelerating path … or 
possibly in that middle ground of steady growth.  
 
II. Artificial Intelligence and the Singularity 
 For those with a background primarily in economics, the present section is 
likely to read like science fiction. It will explain the history and a modern view about 
how the rapid improvements in computation and artificial intelligence (AI) have the 
potential to increase its productivity and breadth to the extent that human labor and 
intelligence will become increasingly superfluous. The standard discussion in 
computer science has no explicit economic analysis and leaves open important 
economic issues that will be addressed in later sections. 
                                                        
2 There is a vast literature on the potential sources of stagnation. In the modern era, the “Limits to 
Growth” school was an early computerized modeling effort that produced scenarios for overshoot 
and decline in living standards (see Meadows et al 1972 and Ranjens et al 1990). Gordon (2012, 
2015) argues that a decline in fundamental inventions may slow growth of leading countries. Some 
foresee a long period of demand-side stagnation in the wake of the long recession that began in 
2008 (see Summers 2014). 
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 It will be useful to summarize the argument before giving further 
background. The productivity of computers and software has grown at phenomenal 
rates for more than a half-century, and rapid growth has continued up to the 
present. Developments in machine learning and artificial intelligence are taking on 
an increasing number of human tasks, moving from calculations to search to speech 
recognition, psychotherapy, and robotic activities on the road and battlefield. At the 
present growth of computational capabilities, some have argued, information 
technologies will have the skills and intelligence of the human brain itself. For 
discussions of the background and trends, see Moravec (1988), Kurzweil (2000, 
2005), Schmid and Cohen (2013). 
 The foundation of the accelerationist view is the continuing rapid 
growth in the productivity of computing. One measure of the productivity is the cost 
of a standardized operation in constant prices, shown in Figure 1. The costs of a 
standard computation have declined at an average annual rate of 53% per year over 
the period 1940-2012. There may have been a slowing in the speed of chip 
computations over the last decade, but the growth in parallel, cloud, and high-
performance clusters as well as improvements in software appear to have offset 
that for many applications.  
Computer scientists project the trend shown in Figure 1 into the indefinite 
future. At some point, these projections move from computer science to computer 
science fiction. They involve improved conventional devices and eventually 
quantum computing. If high-qubit quantum computing becomes feasible, then 
computing will be essentially free and the constraints on artificial intelligence will 






One important milestone will be when inexpensive computers attain the 
computing capacity of the human brain. Current estimates are that the 
computational capacity of the human brain is in the range of 1018 computations per 
second (sometimes measured as “flops” or floating point operations per second). 
The fastest supercomputer as of 2015 was clocked at 3.4 x 1017 flops, and the speed 
of supercomputers has been growing at a rate of 82% per year over the 2007-2015 
period (Top500, 2015). At this rate of increase, supercomputers will reach the 
upper level of 1018 flops by 2017. Computational speed does not easily translate into 




Figure 1. The progress of computing measured in cost per computation per second 
deflated by the price index for GDP in 2006 prices 
 
Source: Nordhaus (2008) updated by the author using PassMark from 










































with. Others have put the date at which human intelligence would be attained by 
computers from 10 to 100 years in the future. 
As computer scientists look further into their crystal ball, they foresee 
artificial intelligence moving toward superintelligence, which denotes “intellect that 
is much smarter than the best human brains in practically every field, including 
scientific creativity, general wisdom and social skills.” (Bostrum, 2006)  
At the point where computers have achieved superintelligence, we have 
reached the “Singularity” where humans become economically superfluous in the 
sense that they make no difference to economic performance. Superintelligent 
computers are the last invention humans would make, as described by the 
mathematician Irving Good (1965) as follows: 
Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass 
all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of 
machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine 
could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an 
“intelligence explosion,” and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. 
Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need 
ever make. 
This point at which the rate and breadth of technological change will be so great is 
sometimes call the “Singularity” in a sense analogous to passing over the event 
horizon into a black hole – here the event horizon is where the forces of computer 
intelligence leave no room for human interventions.3 
 Before ourselves falling into the event horizon of accepting the Singularity 
hypothesis, we need to clarify some of the implicit economic assumptions that lie 
behind it. This will be the purpose of the next section. 
 
                                                        
3 The notion of Singularity of superintelligence is often attributed to John von Neumann. The only 
reference to “Singularity” comes in an appreciation by Stanislaw Ulam to von Neumann in 1958: 
“One conversation centered on the ever accelerating progress of technology and changes in the 
mode of human life, which gives the appearance of approaching some essential Singularity in the 




III.  Historical perspectives on Singularity in economics 
Societal Singularity is a recent theory, but concerns about replacement of 
humans by machines have been persistent for more than two centuries. The 
concerns tended to focus on displacement of particular skills or occupational 
categories. With the rise of computers, the major concern has been the replacement 
of unskilled labor by computers.  
Macroeconomic concerns about rapid productivity growth and “automation,” 
as it was called in the early days, focused first on the potential for satiation of human 
wants and a crisis either of unemployment or superabundant leisure. This was the 
theme of J.M. Keynes’s essay, “The Economic Prospects for Our Grandchildren” 
(1930). He wrote: 
Suppose that a hundred years hence we are eight times better off than today. 
Assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the 
economic problem may be solved. This means that the economic problem is 
not—if we look into the future—the permanent problem of the human 
race….Must we not expect a general “nervous breakdown”? Thus for the first 
time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent 
problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to 
occupy the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for 
him, to live wisely and agreeably and well. 
Although we are close to the hundred-year mark, perhaps humans are suffering 
from a nervous breakdown, but there is no sign that humans have found themselves 
satiated with goods or overendowed with leisure.  
One of the most impressive attempts to deal with the macroeconomic 
implications of computerization was Herbert Simon in “The Shape of Automation” 
(1965). Simon was unique in the intellectual history of the accelerationist debate in 
being a pioneering computer scientist as well as a leading economist. Writing a half-
century ago, he was a self-described “technological radical.” He wrote, “I believe 
that, in our time, computers will be able to do anything a man can do.” (p. xii-xiii) At 
the same time, he was not what I will call an accelerationist, holding that “computers 
and automation will contribute to a continuing, but not greatly accelerated, rise in 
productivity.” (p. xiii) As we show below, it seems likely that if, as Simon believed, 
computers can duplicate humans, then productivity would greatly accelerate. 
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Simon’s analysis was very simple, relying on what is known as the “factor 
price frontier.” This is the concept that, under highly stylized conditions, factor 
rewards can be summarized by the equation: 
(1 )  = 1L Kwa r a    
In Simon’s analysis (similar to the second model used below), output is produced by 
labor and capital, there are constant returns to scale, there is one good that can be 
used for either consumption or new capital. In this equation, 
  wage rate,  = labor input coefficient,Lw a  = capital input coefficient,Ka and r = real 
interest rate. The price of goods is normalized to one. 
 Simon correctly argues that technological change affects unit inputs by 
lowering the labor and/or capital input coefficients so that at existing factor prices, 
the cost of production with the new technology is less than 1. Using the notation of 
the factor-price equation (where subscripts 0 are original factor prices, and 
asterisks denote the new technology) with an innovation,
* *
0 0(1 )  < 1.L Lw a r a 
Under competition, factor prices will rise until the cost will be equal to the price at 1, 
so in equilibrium, an innovative technology will raise either wage rates or interest 
rates or both.  
Simon does not deploy a formal model for his critical next step. He argues that 
labor is inelastically supplied while capital is elastically supplied (so r is close to 
constant). This leads him to conclude that future changes in technology from 
automation will lead to nearly constant interest rates. He further argues 
(mistakenly) for a near-constant share of capital in national income, which then 
implies that “almost all the increased productivity will go to labor.” (p. 15) 
 Simon’s pathbreaking analysis pointed to an important result about factor 
prices – that it impossible in the neoclassical framework to have both a falling rate 
of profit and immiseration of the working classes (a formal analysis is in Samuelson 
1957). But his analysis was unable to deal with the potential of rapidly growing 
capital productivity in the case where the share of capital in national output is rising 
rather than stable. 
 There is remarkably little writing on Singularity in the modern 
macroeconomic literature. While trend productivity growth has clearly risen from 
8 
 
the period before the Industrial Revolution, the workhorse models today assume 
steady productivity and real income growth into the future.   
The potential for accelerating economic growth has arisen occasionally as a 
curiosity in the economic literature. Explosive growth was explored in studies on 
endogenous technological change. (Similar but less explosive results are found in 
the “AK model,” but those are not examined here.) The key feature of the 
endogenous technology models is that knowledge is a produced input. One 
formulation would be that knowledge growth is proportional to the inputs into the 
production process. Here At is technological knowledge, Yt is output, a fraction λ of 
output is devoted to inventive inputs, /tdA dt is knowledge growth, and its growth is 
a function of inventive inputs, as in / ( )t tdA dt Y
  . To simplify this greatly, 
assume that output is produced with labor, and that labor grows at a constant 
growth rate n. If β > 1, which corresponds to increasing returns to inventive inputs, 
then the growth rate of output tends to infinity (see particularly Romer 1986, 1990). 
The prospect of unbounded growth rates has not been taken seriously in the 
empirical growth literature for both technical and empirical reasons. The empirical 
reasons are that productivity growth has not accelerated in recent years. The 
technical reason is that it has unattractive assumptions about the knowledge-
generation function, particularly the lack of diminishing returns to inventive inputs. 
For useful discussions of the shortcomings of the model, see Jones (1995, 1995a). 
A final potential source of rising productivity growth comes from the benign 
version of Baumol’s cost disease. Baumol and his co-authors emphasized the 
potential for low-productivity-growth industries to have rising costs, and potentially 
to slow aggregate economic growth (see Baumol and Bowen 1965, Baumol 1967, 
Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff 1985). However, depending upon the substitution 
parameters, the impact could be to raise rather than lower aggregate productivity 
growth. This might be called Baumol’s cost euphoria and will be examined below. 
 
IV.  Singularity from the demand and the supply side 
To begin with, I emphasize that rapid growth in the productivity of computers 
or information technology such as shown in Figure 1 has no necessary implication 
for aggregate economic growth. The reason is that the economy does not run on bits 
alone, either on the demand side or the supply side. Consumers may love their 
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iPhones, but they cannot eat the electronic output. Similarly, at least with today’s 
technologies, production requires scarce inputs (“stuff”) in the form of labor, energy, 
and natural resources as well as information for most goods and services. 
The question for the long run is the substitution properties between 
information and other stuff such as conventional, non-informational inputs or 
outputs. Here is the general result: 
Major insight: If information and conventional stuff are elastic substitutes 
either in consumption or in production, then growth will rise, perhaps 
extremely rapidly. However, if information and conventional stuff are 
inelastic in production and consumption, then rapid improvements in 
information technology will eventually be irrelevant to the economy. 
Put more precisely, and as will be developed below, Singularity can arise from 
either the demand or the supply side. Both are the results of substitution toward 
high-growth inputs or outputs and away from stagnant inputs or outputs. On the 
demand side, Singularity would occur if preferences are such that consumer 
spending move increasingly toward high-productivity-growth industries as relative 
prices change. This is Baumol’s cost euphoria. On the supply side, Singularity would 
occur if production has sufficient substitutability that the input bundle moves 
toward rapidly improving information capital as growth proceeds. Both, as we will 
see, will lead to rapid growth over time. I begin with the demand side and then move 
to the supply side. 
V.   The Baumol effect and demand-side Singularity 
I begin by describing the forces from the demand side that might lead to rapid 
growth. These are the mirror image of Baumol’s cost disease, and will be called 
Baumol’s cost euphoria. The idea at the simplest level is that sectors with relatively 
rapid productivity growth have relatively rapid price declines and will therefore 
generally experience a rise in relative consumption levels. The key question for the 
growth in aggregate consumption is whether those sectors with relatively rapid 
productivity growth have rising or falling shares in nominal expenditures. 
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Baumol and his co-authors appeared to hold that the trend pointed toward 
stagnationism because of rising expenditure shares of stagnant sectors. For 
example, Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff (1985), p. 815-816 concluded as follows: 4  
The [real] output shares of the progressive and stagnant sectors have in fact 
remained fairly constant in the postwar period, so that with rising relative 
prices, the share of total expenditures on the (stagnant) services and their 
share of the labor force have risen dramatically.… 
Unfortunately, their analysis was made with old-style (Laspeyres) output indexes, 
so the calculations using real output shares were biased. 
We can use a two-sector example to understand Baumol-type Singularity. 
Assume that the economy has two sectors– call them information and handicrafts – 
produced by a single composite input. The rates of productivity growth are very 
high and very low, respectively. According to the Baumol mechanism, the relatively 
prices will be changing rapidly in favor of information.  
If demand substitution is inelastic (technically, if the elasticity of substitution 
in demand between to two goods is less than one and the income elasticities are 
unity), then handicrafts eventually dominate expenditures, and the rate of growth of 
consumption will approach the rate of growth of productivity in the handicrafts 
sector. By contrast, if substitution is elastic (the elasticity of substitution in demand 
between to two goods is greater than one with unit income elasticities), then 
information dominates consumption, and the growth in consumption tends to the 
growth rate in the information sector. So here the critical parameter is the elasticity 
of substitution in the demand between the two kinds of goods. 
Analysis of the Baumol effect 
A more rigorous statement is as follows for the two-sector example. Assume 
that there are two consumption goods (C1 and C2) that are information and 
handicrafts, respectively. Outputs are competitively produced with a single 
exogenously growing composite input, L. Productivity growth is assumed constant 
in each industry (at rates h1 and h2).  Preferences are homothetic with a constant 
elasticity of substitution between the two goods, σ.  Given these assumptions, prices 
in the two sectors are falling at rate h1 and h2 relative to wages. Total consumption 
                                                        
4 Op. cit., p. 815-816. 
11 
 
as measured by an ideal index (such as the Tornqvist index) will be growing at rate 
1 1 2 2h h  , where  1 2 and   are the relative expenditure shares of the two goods. 
With some work we can show that the ratio of the shares of the two industries is 
changing at the logarithmic rate of 1 2) 1).( (h h    
So for example, if σ = 1.25, h1 = 10% per year and h2 =0% per year, then the 
share of information will be rising at approximately 10   0.25 = 2.5% per year 
(percent, not percentage points). Or to take a specific example of computers 
(formally, Information processing equipment), the relative price decrease over the 
last decade has been about 10% per year relative to other consumption. The share 
of computers in 2000 was approximately 2.0%. If the elasticity of substitution 
between computers and other goods was 1.25, then the share would grow to 2.6% 
after a decade. This is almost exactly the actual pattern over this period. 
We can also easily calculate the Baumol effect for the two sector example. The 
growth in consumption (in the superlatively measured Tornqvist index) equals the 
weighted growth of consumption, 1 1 2 2( )( ) ( ( ))t h t tht  . Under the assumptions in 
the last paragraph, the growth in the index of consumption over the decade would 
increase from 1.20% to 1.26% per year, or an increase of 0.006% per year per year. 
This is equal to the change in shares times the difference in the growth rates 
(change in shares = 0.06 %-points per year   growth rate difference of 10% per 
year). Note that with elastic substitution the growth rate in this model tends toward 
the growth in the high-productivity-growth industry. The share of computers tends 
to one, so the weighted growth rate tends toward 10% per year in the simple 
example. 
 If we move to a multi-sector example, the analysis is analogous but more 
complicated. The analysis is laid out in Nordhaus (2008) and will be summarized 
here. Assume the growth rate of the ideal index of consumption is given by an 
almost ideal demand system in which consumption growth in each sector is a 
function of the growth in relative prices of the good and an income effect. If we 
assume that the income elasticities are uncorrelated with the changes in relative 
prices, then the average change in shares for each good will  be determined by the 
average change in the relative price of that good times the price-elasticity of demand 
minus 1 times the relative price movement. So this is the analog of the two-sector 
example where the price-elasticity replaces the elasticity of substitution. The 
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aggregate effect is then the weighted average of this term plus errors due to 
exogenous growth rates plus income effects. 
  
VI. Empirical tests of demand-side Singularity 
We can test for the Baumol or demand-side Singularity by looking at the 
relationship between the shares of different goods in total consumption and the 
trends in relative prices.  
In a prior study of trends of major industries for the U.S., I determined that 
there was a tendency for industries with falling relative productivity and rising 
relative prices to have rising nominal shares and shares of employment. This was 
consistent with the trend identified by Baumol and his colleagues cited above of the 
cost disease. I concluded, “There is a negative association of productivity growth 
with the growth in nominal output. In other words, stagnant industries tend to take 
a rising share of nominal output; however, the relationship is only marginally 
statistically significant.”  
An alternative approach for this study focuses on consumption as that seems 
a more natural place to examine substitution patterns. We can test the impact of the 
composition by examining whether those sectors that have the most rapid decline in 
prices tend to have rising or declining shares in expenditures.  
The BEA has developed long-term data on consumption expenditures and 
prices starting in 1929. These data include 89 distinct sectors ranging in size from 
owner-occupied housing to food provided on the farm. In our analysis, we take a 
simple regression of the log of expenditure change on the log of price change for 
different periods. The results are shown in Table 1, which looks at both sub-periods 
and the total period over the 1929-2012 record. 
While there is no consistent and significant sign, the general pattern is for 
positive coefficients, indicating inelasticity of substitution. If we examine the entire 
period from 1929 to 2012 or pooled sub-periods of the total period, there is a clear 
indication of inelasticity. There are no sub-periods with significant coefficients that 
indicate elasticity, although the last period shows elasticity with marginal 
significance. These results are consistent with the analysis in Nordhaus (2008), 
which focuses on production patterns. 
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An alternative would be to look at major information-technology sectors, 
shown in Table 2. These are elusive to define, but for this purpose I included 
telecommunications, video services, information equipment, internet services, 
telephone, and photographic services. This new economy group shows a different 
pattern from the totality of industries. The prices of the new economy services in 
total have been declining steadily, and the shares have risen during all subperiods. 
However, a statistical analysis of the 6 new-economy sectors along the lines of Table 







Table 1. Coefficient of log price in expenditure equation 
This table reports a regression of following:  
 i 0 1 i i iΔln[expend (t)] Δln[price (t)/price (t)]+ (t).      
Note that a positive price indicates that a rising relative price increases the 
expenditures share and is therefore an indication of inelasticity of demand. 
Period Coefficient t-statistic Observations P-value
1929-1948 0.25 1.10 48 0.012
1948-1969 0.90 2.59 54 0.012
1969-1990 0.06 0.37 83 0.714
1990-2013 -0.17 -1.58 90 0.118
1929-1969 0.15 0.50 48 0.617
1969-2012 -0.02 -0.26 83 0.796
1929-2012 0.44 2.04 48 0.047




The size of the Baumol stagnation effect is small for the estimates that are 
provided here. We show in Figure 2 a calculation of the Baumol effect for selected 
well-measured industries.5 This is the sum of the changes in shares times the 
logarithmic price change. A positive number indicates a cost disease. For these 
industries, the Baumol effect subtracts 0.098% per year from aggregate 
consumption growth if gasoline is included, and subtracts 0.015% per year without 
gasoline. In both cases the effect is small, but in neither case is the effect to increase 
economic growth. The dominant effect of gasoline arises because it not only has a 
large share but is extremely price-inelastic in the short run. 
                                                        
5 These are selected both because the price indexes and real output measures are reliable and 
because they show a relatively large composition effect with large differences in output growth. The 
industries are Food, Imputed rental of owner-occupied nonfarm housing, Electricity, 
Pharmaceutical products, New motor vehicles, Motor vehicle fuels, Telecommunication services, 
Internet access, Video and audio equipment, Information processing equipment, Magazines, 




Table 2. Share and price change for new economy sectors 
This table shows the average change in relative prices and in the shares of six 







Video equipment -11.1% -1.8%
Information equipment -21.1% 4.7%
Internet -5.4% 24.7%
Telecommunications -6.3% 3.3%




These results indicate that the Baumol effect of changing shares in 
consumption is a force for stagnation rather than acceleration. In plain English, the 
sectors that are experiencing the most rapid price declines are also experiencing 
slight declines in expenditure shares. This tendency means that growth in aggregate 
consumption would slow over time if the underlying technological trends were 
stable within individual industries. However, the impact of changing shares on the 
aggregate growth in consumption has historically been extremely small – in the 
order of minus 0.1% per year. The reason is that the shares of high- and low-
productivity-growth industries have not changed appreciably over the last two 




Figure 2. Baumol effect for selected well-measured industries 
This shows the net effect of changing shares on growth in consumption (measured 
as a Tornqvist index). A positive number indicates in this graph indicates reduced 
overall growth. This signifies that on average industries with rising relative prices 











1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010





VII. Supply-side Singularity 
 A second accelerationist mechanism involves substitution in production. We 
can again start with a two-sector model, similar to that of Simon above, to motivate 
the analysis. In this model, there are two factors of production and a single 
composite output that can be used for either consumption or investment. One input 
is either fixed or slowly growing, and it is usefully thought of as labor. The other is 
produced capital, which is produced by a rapidly improving technology. The natural 
produced input to consider is information technology, and will be identified in 
practice as “information capital.”  
In the simple two-input model, analogous to the Baumol effect, the key 
parameter is the elasticity of substitution in production. If the elasticity of 
substitution is greater than one, then information capital takes an increasing share 
of inputs, and the growth of productivity rises. If the elasticity of substitution is less 
than one, then information capital’s share in production declines over time, and the 
growth in aggregate productivity tends toward the growth of the relatively fixed 
factor, labor. In the unit-elastic Cobb-Douglas case, productivity growth tends to a 
constant rate. 
 There are clearly other cases as well, such as multiple goods and multiple 
inputs, which are discussed below. However, the analysis is extremely simple in the 
one-good/two-input case. And the empirical tests are relatively clean. So it seems 
best to start here and see what we find. 
To develop the model further, we use a standard closed-economy neoclassical 
growth model with a constant savings rate and with a particular modification. 
Assume that labor is growing at a constant rate n and that all technological change is 
capital-augmenting at a constant and rapid rate. In effect, we consider only 
information capital as an endogenous variable and sweep all other capital into labor.  
 The model is straightforward. Output and capital growth are given by  
(1)    ( , )
(2)    /
t t t t
t t t
Y F AK L
K t sY K

   
  
So the growth of output is: 
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(3)    ( ) [ ( ) ( )] (1 ) ( )t t t t t tg Y g A g K g L      
Here, 
t is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, which would equal 
capital’s share of national income in a perfectly competitive economy. Combining 
the equations, we get: 
(4)      ( ) [ ( ) / ] (1 )t t t t t tg Y g A sY K n        
 For a Cobb-Douglas economy,  constantt   , which implies that 
(5)     ( ) [ / (1 )] ( )t tg Y n g A     
This is a straightforward balanced growth path. 
For our purposes, the more interesting cases are where the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor ( ) is bounded away from one. In the case of 
inelastic production ( 1)   , the competitive share of capital tends to zero, and 
the growth rate tends to the stagnationist case of zero growth in per capita output: 
(6)     ( ) (1 )tg Y n n    
 The accelerationist case is where the elasticity of substitution is bounded 
above one ( 1)   . The algebra in the general case is complicated, so simplify by 
assuming that the rate of growth in information productivity is a constant h. 
Because production shows elastic substitution, the elasticity of output with respect 
to capital (or the competitive share of capital) tends to one. As 1,  production 
becomes linear in capital, or t t tY cAK , so / .
ht
t tY K ce This leads to the Singularity 
result: 
( ) (7)     ( ) / ( / ) .h t Tt t t T Tg Y h sY K h s Y K e 
        
 The surprise here is that the growth of output is unbounded. In effect, the 
economy is just information produced by information capital, which is produced by 
information, which in turn is producing information ever faster every year. We don’t 
need to push this result to the absurd limit. Rather the three key points are (1) the 
value share of information capital in the input bundle is tending toward unity, (2) as 
a result the contribution of information capital is rising, and finally (3) because 
information capital is a produced input, the growth rate of output is accelerating. 
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A numerical example 
This result is so surprising that we can perform numerical analyses to make 
sure it is not a mistake or a possibility for distant millennia. To get a flavor for the 
dynamics, perform a simple simulation. Assume that labor is constant, that all 
technological change is capital-augmenting at 10% per year, and that the elasticity 
of substitution between labor and information capital is 1.25. Figure 3 shows a 
typical simulation of the share of capital and the growth rates of output and wages. 
Growth goes off the charts after about 70 years.  
  
 A second surprising result concerns the impact of rapidly growing growth on 
wages. Wages grow increasingly rapidly in this specification: wage growth reaches 
200% per year in year 80. Capital eventually gets virtually all the cake, but the 
crumbs left for labor – which are really small parts of the increasingly large 




Figure 3. Simulation of a growth model with rapid technological change in capital 






















































depends upon the parameters, but with elastic production and rapid capital 
productivity, the pattern always looks like Figure 3. 
VIII. Tests for Supply-Side Singularity 
Are we heading for the Singularity? If so, how far off is our rendezvous? 
Optimists believe that superintelligence could be achieved by the middle of the 21st 
century based on the progress in computing power. We can apply the economic 
models developed above to examine observable economic variables that can 
distinguish supply-side accelerationism from stagnation or steady growth.  
The Simon-style growth model has several predictions that are consistent with a 
Singularity in economic growth. Among the most salient are the following six 
diagnostic signals. 
1. The most important implication of the accelerationist growth model is that 
output growth is rising. This will show up as either rising labor productivity 
(LP) growth or rising total factor productivity (TFP) growth. While this is 
clearly a central prediction, it does not provide a strong differential diagnosis 
because the rising productivity growth could come from other sources. 
2. A second important and cleaner differential diagnosis concerns the share of 
information capital in inputs. The clear prediction of the accelerationist view 
is that the nominal capital share in the value of inputs is rising, and should 
eventually rise to one. 
3. A third prediction is that the relative prices of investment and capital goods 
are falling relative to output. Indeed, the price decline of total capital should 
trend toward the price decline of information capital as information capital 
gradually invades the entire economy. 
4. A further prediction is that the real capital-output ratio should be rising at a 
very rapid rate. 
5. The share of information capital in total capital in the accelerationist 
economy will be growing toward one.   
6. The rise in wages will depend upon the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor. In cases of plausible elasticities, wage growth becomes 
extremely rapid.  
We will discuss below measurement issues that may cloud the data in a fashion 
that hides the accelerating growth of productivity. While the discussion suggests 
that this is to date empirically relatively small for information-based output, this 
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criticism would apply primarily to test 1 and 6. Tests 2 and 5 are based on nominal 
measures and are largely unaffected by errors in price and output measurement. 
Tests 3 and 4 both require that the price of investment (or capital) relative to output 
is accurately measured. This is similar to the reliability of tests 2 and 5 but is 
probably less open to bias because some of the output-price bias will be offset by 
investment-price bias since these are the same goods. In any case, at least two of the 
tests (2 and 5), and perhaps the most useful ones, are largely immune to 
measurement problems. 
Test 1: Accelerating productivity growth? 
A first question is whether productivity growth is accelerating. Figure 4 
shows an estimate of multi-factor productivity for the U.S. private business sector. 
The 1949-2014 period shows an average MFP growth rate of 1.3% per year. MFP 
growth has been on a slight declining trend over the period. The period since 1990 
saw a rise in productivity until the mid-2000s, but then growth has declined. The 
average MFP growth over the 1990-2012 period is slightly below (-0.03 + 0.03 % 
per year) the earlier period. 
 The summary on MFP growth is that there is no sign of any acceleration of 
multifactor productivity as of the most recent data for the U.S. Even with the 
potential biases discussed in the next section, it would be difficult to discern any 






Test 2: Rising share of capital? 
  A central diagnostic forecast of Singularity is a rising share of capital in 
national income. (Note that the “share” in the growth model is the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital. That parameter is not observable, so we use the 
income share, which would equal the elasticity under competitive conditions.)  
 Figure 5 shows the trend in the income share of capital (strictly speaking, all 
income other than labor compensation) over the period 1948-2013. One sectoral 
concept is the entire economy, while the other is the non-farm business sector. The 
latter is better measured and provides a cleaner definition of capital income than 
the former, which includes a large component in owner-occupied housing as well as 























Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Five-year moving average.  
 
Figure 4. Multifactor productivity growth, 1949-2014 
Multifactor productivity measures total output growth minus total input growth 
using a Tornqvist index.  




other than the net return to capital, such as depreciation, royalties on minerals, 
interest income, income of proprietors, and some labor income. Some analysts 
suspect that a substantial part of the increase in capital’s share is either 
mismeasurement or is due to housing, so the estimates here are probably an upper 
bound on the share change (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 2103 and Rognlie 2015). 
 
Table 3 shows regressions of the shares in the two sectors with and without 
breaks in trend in 1990 and 2000. Both show a small upward trend of about 0.2 
percentage points per year since 1990 and close to 0.5 percentage points per year 
since 2000.  This trend is supportive of the accelerationist hypothesis at the raw 
data level. However, since we do not have a good understanding of the reasons for 
the rise in capital’s share, further research would be necessary to determine 
whether there is a link between this rise and a rapid rise in capital productivity, and 
particularly in information capital.  
 Projecting future trends such as those of capital’s share in Figure 5 is clearly a 
primitive exercise. However, projections are useful to give some perspective on 
when the Singularity might become more apparent. Our simulation model shown in 
 
 
Figure 5. Trend in share of capital for US in overall economy and non-farm business 
sector 
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Figure 2 indicates that the acceleration in output becomes quite apparent (with the 
growth rate crossing the 20% per year threshold) when capital’s share crosses the 
80% level. At the rate of increase from a forecast using the regression model 
underlying the last set of estimates in Table 3 (+0.47% per year), the 80% rate will 
not be reached until 2100 (plus or minus 20 years depending on the sample period 
of the regression). So while the test is positive, Singularity is apparently many 
decades in the future using this diagnostic test. 
 
Test 3: Accelerating decline in capital goods prices? 
The prices of investment and capital goods have been falling relative to 
output (GDP), consumption, and labor for most of the last half-century.  Since the 
accelerationist hypothesis holds that the price of capital goods will be falling ever 
 
 
Table 3. Regression coefficients for equation with share of capital as dependent 
variable and time and breaks in the trends in 1990 and 2000. Number under 
coefficient is t-statistic. 
 
Source: Data from sources in Figure 5. 
 

















more rapidly, we examine the price of various definitions of capital goods. To 
calculate the price index, I take the ratio of the current-cost capital stock to the 
quantity index of capital developed by the BEA.6 
 Figure 6 shows the rate of decline for seven important series. This shows the 
decline in the price of the capital stock relative to labor’s wages, this being the 
important variable for the production function in the growth model. While capital 
prices have continued to decline, there has been no significant change in the last 
decade; indeed all six sectors show either the same or slower relative price declines 
in the last period. 
 From the point of view of the accelerationist hypothesis, the key variable to 
look at is the decline in the price of all capital goods relative to wages. For this 
purpose, we examine all “private fixed assets,” which include business structures 
and equipment, residential structures, and intellectual property. The relative price 
decline here (shown as the first set of bars in Figure 6) has been 1.4, 1.5, and 0.5 
percent per year for the periods 1960-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2012. Clearly, 
these are not only small declines but not accelerationist at all. 
  
                                                        
6 Current-cost estimates of capital stocks are derived by converting the constant-dollar estimates of 
stocks to the prices of the current period. Chain-type quantity indexes are computed using the 
Fisher quantity index formula. The ratio should be the Fisher ideal price index under the self-






Test 4: Rapidly rising capital-output ratio? 
 Another important diagnostic concerns the real capital-output ratio. As is 
seen in the growth model sketched above, the rapidly rising quality of capital 
implies that the capital stock (in efficiency units) will rise increasingly rapidly 
relative to output. The rise will come because informational capital grows rapidly, 
and also because informational capital takes a larger share of the capital stock.7 
 Table 4 shows the trends in the real capital-output ratio since 1960. The 
capital stocks shown are different components of private capital corrected for 
quality by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and other government agencies. The 
output measure is gross business product. The first line shows that the overall 
                                                        
7 The relationship between tests 3 and 4 is the following. Let pK = the price of capital goods, V = 
current-cost value of capital, K = quantity of capital, pY = the price of output, Y = quantity of output, 
and Q = nominal value of output. Quantities in both cases are measured as nominal values divided 
by price indexes. The real capital output ratio in test 4 is K/Y = (pKK/pYY)/(pK/pY), while the price 




Figure 6. Rate of decline of capital prices relative to labor’s wage rate. 













capital-output ratio has been falling slowly over this period, although it has been 
close to constant in the last subperiod. Looking at the information capital 
components, these have been rising relative to output, but only at modest rates. In 
any case, the overall contribution of informational capital has been too small to lead 
to a rising capital-output ratio.  
 
Test 5: Share of information capital rising? 
A further test is that informational capital should be a rising share of the 
capital stock. Indeed, as the economy approaches the Singularity, the share of 
informational capital should approach 100%. 
Table 5 shows the shares of informational capital in total private assets. 
(These are the current-cost net stock of private fixed assets.) It is clear that 
informational capital is becoming a more important part of the capital stock. The 
growth is particularly strong in intellectual property products. Surprisingly, 




Table 4. Growth rates of the real capital output ratio, different sectors 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Sector 1960-1990 1990-2000 2000-2012
Private fixed assets -0.5% -1.2% -0.2%
Equipment 0.7% 0.4% 0.6%
  Nonresidential equipment 0.6% 0.4% 0.6%
    Information processing equipment 6.4% 5.5% 3.9%
      Computers and peripheral equipment na 21.1% 6.3%
Intellectual property products 4.3% 4.4% 4.1%
  Nonresidential intellectual property products 2.0% 2.1% 1.8%
    Software 18.2% 10.2% 3.2%
    Research and development 2.5% 0.4% 1.4%
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the latest period. So this test would appear to conform to the Singularity view, 
although there is still a long way to go before these sectors dominate investment. 
To determine whether an inflection point is in the near future, we project the 
share of informational capital into the future at the growth rate for the 1960-2012 
period. Our numerical example suggests that the growth rate begins to accelerate 
when the capital share exceeds 80% of income. Our extrapolation of Table 5 
indicates that this would not occur within the next century, so the Singularity 
appears at best distant by this test. 
 
Test 6: Rising wage growth? 
 A final test is that wages should be growing more rapidly. The extent of 
acceleration of wages will depend upon the elasticity of substitution, but as long as 
the elasticity is not too high, wages will grow at a rate close to that of output per 
hour worked. 
 Table 6 shows trend for two alternative measures of real compensation, for 
the entire economy and for the private business sector. (Note that this divides by 




Table 5. Share of information capital in total capital 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Sector 1960 1990 2012
Equipment 17.6% 19.2% 15.7%
  Nonresidential equipment 17.3% 19.0% 15.5%
    Information processing equipment 1.8% 4.5% 3.7%
      Computers and peripheral equipment 0.0% 0.7% 0.5%
Intellectual property products 2.8% 4.6% 6.4%
  Nonresidential intellectual property products 2.8% 4.6% 6.4%
    Software 0.0% 0.7% 1.6%
    Research and development 1.5% 2.8% 3.6%
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from those usually cited. Additionally, this measure is compensation including 
fringes rather than just wages or wages and salaries.)  Real wages accelerated 
slightly in the first decade of the new economy (1990-2000), but growth then 
slowed over the subsequent period. So the real wage test clearly fails to show any 
signs of Singularity. 
 
 
IX.  Summary of Tests for Singularity 
Table 7 shows a summary of tests of Singularity. Five of the seven tests are 
negative for Singularity while two are positive. We can also calculate for the two 
positive tests how far we are from the point of Singularity. I define Singularity as a 
time when the economic growth rate crosses 20% per year. Using simple 
extrapolation for the two positive tests, the time at which the economy might 





Table 6. Increase in real product wages, different periods 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Increase in real wages (annual average % per year)
Period











Table 7. Results of the Singularity tests and time to Singularity 
 








Baumol effect on shares of high-
productivity industries Negative x
Supple side
Test 1: Accelerating 
productivity growth Negative x
Test 2: Rising share of capital
Positive
100 years + 20 
years
Test 3: Increasing decline of 
capital goods prices Negative x
Test 4: Rapidly rising capital-
output ratio Negative x
Test 5: Share of information 
capital rising Positive > 100 years
Test 6: Rising wage growth Negative x
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X. Interpretations and Elaborations 
 
 The tests and theory above raise several issues of interpretation. I consider the 
question of minimal resource inputs, heterogeneous labor, measurement problems, 
the social structure of a Singular economy, and concerns about evil agents. 
 
a. Violations of basic physical laws 
 An objection to all of this analysis that immediately comes to mind is whether 
accelerationism violates basic laws of nature. All processes need minimal energy, 
and energy is limited if superabundant. Other potential limiting resources are fresh 
and clean water, oxygen, and exotic minerals to build machines. Some would invoke 
the second law of thermodynamics, which holds that increasing order must be offset 
by increasing disorder elsewhere. 
 The issues here are too deep to be adequately treated in the present study. While 
some resources are indeed needed for all production processes, the inputs can in 
theory be reduced sharply, and potentially as rapidly as production increases. This 
is vividly illustrated for computation. An early computer was the ENIAC (shown at 
the upper left in Figure 1). It required about 150 kW to operate, or approximately 
55 watts per floating point operation (flop). A desktop computer today requires 
about 75 watts to produce 1013 flops. While this is only an approximation, this 
calculation indicates that the energy requirement for computation has declined by a 
factor of 10,000,000,000,000. In recent years, the energy use has declined at 
approximately the rate of improvement of computers. 
 So the bottom line on resources is that at least in theory improvements in 
material use and miniaturization can overcome the physical limitations on 
accelerating growth. As Richard Feynman said, “There is plenty of room at the 
bottom.”  
b. Heterogeneous labor in the growth model 
 The Simon-type growth model of information and productivity analyzed above 
has the shortcoming that it assumes heterogeneous capital and labor. 
Heterogeneous output is considered in the Baumol example. We consider in this 
section the interesting implications of adding heterogeneous labor to the analysis.  
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 Economists have generally found that skilled workers are more adaptable to 
rapid changes in information technology than middle-skilled, manual, or unskilled 
workers. The process is summarized nicely by Autor (2014): 
“Routine tasks” [are ones] that follow an exhaustive set of rules and hence are 
readily amenable to computerization. Routine tasks characteristic of many 
middle-skilled cognitive and manual activities, such as bookkeeping, clerical 
work and repetitive production tasks. Because the core tasks of these 
occupations follow precise, well-understood procedures, they are increasingly 
codified in computer software and performed by machines. This force has led to 
a substantial decline in employment in clerical, administrative support and, to a 
lesser degree, production and operative employment… [135] 
 We can extend the Simon model to include heterogeneous labor by considering 
some polar cases. Assume as one example that unskilled labor is a perfect substitute 
for informational capital, while the other input is skilled labor. As above, skilled 
labor has high but imperfect substitutability with capital. We then directly apply the 
analysis above. The marginal product and wage of unskilled labor fall proportionally 
with capital prices. More realistically, if there is a reservation wage for unskilled 
labor, say because of income support, the unemployment rate of unskilled labor 
rises to unity, and the employment of unskilled labor approaches zero. 
 As a historical analog, consider the fate of human adding machines of the 
nineteenth century. As explained in Nordhaus (2007), there was a revolution in the 
employment of human calculators around 1900. In his book on calculation, Orton 
writes, “To be able to add two, three or four columns of figures at once, is deemed by 
many to be a Herculean task, and only to be accomplished by the gifted few, or in 
other words, by mathematical prodigies.” (Orton 1866, p. v) “Lightning calculators,” 
the prodigies who could add up columns of numbers rapidly, were at a premium. 
Indeed, John D. Rockefeller was a champion lightning calculator before he turned to 
being a champion monopolist. The advent of calculators changed all that. Aside from 
quiz shows, there is zero demand today for lightning calculators. Such would be the 
fate of unskilled labor in this simple two-labor model as we approached the 
Singularity. 
 What of skilled labor? In the simple two-labor-input model described here, 
skilled labor would have the same future as labor in the one-labor Simon model. Its 
share in national income would tend to zero as capital took over the economy. But 
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skilled labor would be fully employed, and its wages would begin to rise rapidly as 
shown in Figure 1. We would see social and economic polarization with a 
vengeance. 
 Perhaps the pattern of impacts would be reversed, as is suggested by Autor 
(2014). Perhaps the work of skilled labor would be substituted by information 
technology while unskilled labor would be the only group not susceptible to 
substitution by information technology. Perhaps, patients would be diagnosed and 
treated by computers rather than doctors. Classes would be taught online by 
computerized instructors and virtual teaching assistants rather than Ph. Ds. Central 
banks would finally, in Milton Friedman’s vision, be run by a computerized rule 
rather than imperfect discretion. Workers just hook up the monitors, plug in the 
machines, and make sure that the Fed has the latest operating system. Since the skill 
ladder is a two-way street, skilled workers would abandon their professional 
degrees as the skilled jobs disappear and all humanity becomes unskilled 
apprentices to computers. We are then back to the Simon model, but in this case 
with the one factor being unskilled labor. Surprisingly, there is much greater labor-
market equality than in the first example. 
c. Measurement issues 
 One concern about the empirical tests of accelerationism is that the major 
increases in productivity are hidden by poor measurement. Hal Varian, the chief 
economist at Google, argues that there is an explosion of productivity underway 
because of the devices, apps, and other digital innovations coming out of Silicon 
Valley. “There is a lack of appreciation for what’s happening in Silicon Valley 
because we don’t have a good way to measure it.” (WSJ 2015). 
 The issues involved in measuring the contribution of new and improved goods 
and services have been carefully studied and raise several thorny issues. The most 
important shortcomings arise from improper measurement of the prices for goods 
that are either new or show rapid improvement. (Recall that “real output” growth is 
nominal output growth less the rate of change of the price of the good. So if price 
increases are overstated, as is the case with improper quality adjustment, then real 
output increases will be understated.) Additional questions arise when goods are 
free. 
 We can illustrate the issue for the case of cell phones. At the beginning, these 
involved a new good, so it would not be possible to have an accurate comparison of 
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how much the price of “cell phone service” was falling. If cell phones are introduced 
late in the product cycle, the increases in consumer welfare from the falling prices 
will be missed. A second issue involves quality change. It is difficult to measure the 
improvement in quality (which implies a fall in price of a standardized good) 
because of the rapid improvements in cell phone design along with the many 
bundled applications. A third issue arises because many of the services provided on 
a smartphone (such as having a flashlight, map, weather forecast, and the like) have 
zero prices. Under the conventions of national output accounting, the value of those 
services is also zero because goods are valued at their market prices. The presence 
of these factors lies behind the contention of Varian and others that actual (as 
opposed to measured) productivity is actually growing rapidly. 
 Business v consumer uses 
 What are we to make of these contentions? We can quickly dispose of one part of 
the issue, which involves the use of IT by companies. To the extent that IT is 
increasing the productivity of companies as an incorrectly measured intermediate 
good, then that would show up as productivity for the industry. If for example free 
Internet services vastly increased the ability of airlines to utilize their fleet more 
efficiently, then measured productivity growth of airlines would rise. So the IT going 
as intermediate products or capital services to business would not lead to 
underestimated aggregate productivity growth. 
 What are the proportions of consumer versus business in information 
technology? We can look at detailed input-output tables to get an idea of the 
magnitudes. Taking the major eleven IT sectors,8 we can divide gross output into 
that part going to consumers and that going to businesses. The former are included 
as personal consumption expenditures, while the latter are investment or 
intermediate purchases. Looking at the input-output structure for 2002, there were 
$1,217 billion in domestically purchased IT goods and services (about 11% of GDP). 
Of these, 77% were purchased by businesses, 23% were by consumers.  The major 
consumer service was telecommunications, where consumers purchased about half 
                                                        
8 The sectors were Computer and peripheral equipment, Audio, video, and communications 
equipment, Semiconductors and electronic components, Electronic instruments, Software 
publishers, Cable networks and program distribution, Internet publishing and broadcasting, 
Telecommunications, Data processing services, Other information services, and Computer systems 
design and related services. Data are from www.bea.gov.  
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of total output. Given these numbers, it seems likely that most of the productivity 
impacts of IT will be captured in either business output or business productivity.  
 Considering the IT purchases by consumers, these comprise about 2½ percent of 
GDP. If productivity growth for these products were underestimated by 10 % per 
year (surely an upper bound on the number), aggregate productivity would be 
underestimated by 0.025 % per year. This hardly makes a dent on the productivity 
slowdown over the last decade. 
 Measurement of consumer surplus 
 A second issue is the provision of free services to consumers (free services to 
businesses are covered by the last section and can be excluded). Perhaps the 
consumer surplus from provision of these services is enormous. This is an ancient 
problem in national income accounting. If the price is zero, then the marginal value 
to consumers is zero, and that is the customary valuation. But perhaps there is great 
value to the inframarginal units, and these were not available in earlier periods.  
 Two issues arise here. First, we should ask how the value of the unmeasured 
value of IT compares with the new products and services of earlier periods. Gordon 
(2012, 2015) persuasively argues that the unmeasured value of inventions of the 
19th and 20th century dwarfs the value of IT. We might point to examples like indoor 
plumbing, anesthetics, electricity, radio, motor vehicles, lighting, photography, 
antibiotics, and even the lowly zipper as examples of goods with vast unmeasured 
consumer surplus.  
 Second, the issue of including consumer surplus raises insuperable obstacles of 
measurement. If we follow this road, we run into the “zero problem” that arises 
when we attempt to measure total utility or happiness rather than value using 
marginal values. Here is an explanation of the issue using the example of the 
consumer surplus of water.9 Suppose that we want to measure the total value of 
consumption of water services in the national accounts. We then need to integrate 
the marginal surpluses between some “zero” level and current consumption. But 
what do we mean by zero? Is it literally zero water consumption in which case 
consumer surplus is equal to the value of life itself and is infinite? Or is it the level of 
                                                        
9 This is drawn from William Nordhaus, “Principles of National Accounting for Nonmarket 
Accounts,” in Dale W. Jorgenson, J. Steven Landefeld, and William D. Nordhaus, Eds., A New 
Architecture for the U.S. National Accounts, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 143-160. 
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consumption in pre-industrial times? If so, should pre-industrial times relate to the 
1700s, when water in the U.S. was plentiful? Or to the time when humans first 
crossed the Bering land bridge, when ice was plentiful but water was scarce? If we 
attempt to measure total surpluses for necessities in too many areas with low 
“zeroes,” we will undoubtedly find ourselves with multiple infinities of the value of 
critical goods and services. Once we travel even a few thoughts down this road, we 
rapidly come to the conclusion that, for purposes of measuring output and income, 
we had best rely on the standard approach of using marginal valuations in all 
sectors. 
 Time use as a complement for free goods and services 
 A final way of looking at the role of IT as unmeasured output is to examine the 
time spent on information activities (this approach was pioneered by Goolsbee and 
Klenow 2005). We might employ this approach to estimate consumer surplus 
(despite our reservations), or more appropriately in our context it might be used to 
estimate the errors introduced by mismeasurement of prices and outputs of these 
services. 
 There are comprehensive data on time use by Americans collected since 2003. 
While it includes email use, it does not include total Internet use. Figure 7 shows the 
history of household use for televisions (reduced by a factor of 20), telephone, and 
email. This does not include a comprehensive survey on Internet use, unfortunately. 
Two points are striking. One is that popular culture has a vastly exaggerated notion 
of how much time on average Americans spend on email. The figure here is 0.03 
hours per day, orders of magnitude less than the 3 hours a day watching television. 
A second striking feature is that the time spent on email is actually declining over 




Figure 7. Time use of electronic media by US household 
Source: American Time Use Survey (atus.bea.gov) 
  _______________________ 
 Based on other less comprehensive data, these numbers are likely to be seriously 
biased underestimates of Internet use. Data from Nielson (2015) adjusted for over-
reporting suggests that people spend slightly under two hours a day on the Internet, 
roughly equally divided between computers and smartphones. Here is an 
illustrative calculation. Assume the average person spends 1.5 hours a day on the 
Internet. Further suppose that time is valued at the marginal post-tax hourly 
compensation of $18 per hour, and that it replaced other time valued at half of that 
value (say watching TV or housework). Further assume that one-third of the 
Internet time is for personal rather than business or instrumental purposes. Then 
for the 245 million persons in the adult population, the total unmeasured value 
would be slightly above $135 billion in 2015, or about 0.7% of GDP. If this 
unmeasured value started at zero in 1995, then productivity growth over this 
period would be underestimated by 0.04% per year. While these numbers are just 
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unmeasured value of “apps and gadgets” is unlikely to make a substantial dent on 
overall growth of national output and productivity.10 
d. The euthanasia of the laboring classes 
 As growth accelerates with superintelligent capital, the rate of return on capital 
and real interest rates fall to zero. This was an outcome envisioned by J.M. Keynes in 
a chapter from The General Theory (Keynes 1935).  
[There would be an] increase the stock of capital up to a point where its 
[marginal product] had fallen to a very low figure…. Now, [this] would mean the 
euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative 
oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital. Interest 
today rewards no genuine sacrifice, any more than does the rent of land. 
 I see, therefore, the rentier aspect of capitalism as a transitional phase which 
will disappear when it has done its work. And with the disappearance of its 
rentier aspect much else in it besides will suffer a sea-change. It will be, 
moreover, a great advantage of the order of events which I am advocating, that 
the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor, will be nothing sudden, 
merely a gradual but prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently … 
and will need no revolution.  
 Keynes’s analysis predated the pioneering work on production functions that 
clarified the key role of the elasticity of substitution on factor shares, and as a result 
he saw only one of several possible outcomes. Keynes’s scenario described a growth 
path in which the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is less than 
one; accumulation in the inelastic case therefore drives not only the rate of return to 
zero but also the share of capital to zero.  
 However, the accelerationist case leads to the opposite outcome, where the share 
of capital goes to unity. In this outcome, we thus would see the euthanasia of the 
laboring classes in the sense that all of income eventually goes to the owners of 
                                                        
10 Goolsbee and Klenow (2005) have substantially higher numbers because they estimate a non-
linear demand curve for Internet services, which has a much higher intercept and higher 
inframarginal values. They also do not correct for business usage. If their estimate is corrected for 
non-consumption usage, the estimate here is about one-half of their linear estimate. The Nielson 
estimate is reduced by about one-third to reflect the higher estimate of TV usage in the Nielson 
compared to the ATUS estimate of time spend watching TV. 
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capital. Workers would be well-paid but would control a vanishing part of national 
output through the fruits of their labor. However, as long as corporations own most 
of the capital, and people or human institutions (including governments through 
taxation) own corporations, capital income will indirectly flow through to humans. 
Since national income equals national output, average income will be growing 
increasingly rapidly.  
 How this will play out in terms of individual equality or inequality goes beyond 
economics to politics, tax and benefit systems, and the nature of dynastic savings. It 
is clear that the Piketty condition for growing inequality (that r > g) definitely will 
not hold, but beyond that little is clear. Will the incomes be captured by the 
Schumpeterian classes – the innovators who design machines and write software 
for them? Or by the wealthy who subvert institutions to increase their wealth? By 
those who are the last humans who are complements rather than substitutes for 
information, perhaps as gardeners or butlers? Perhaps by those who control the 
intelligent machines before they take over?  
 Fortunately, the euthanasia of the laboring classes is far off and will flash 
sufficient warning signals so that, if it does occur, humans will have time to 
contemplate the social structures of such an era. 
e. Autonomous agents in warfare 
 The sector which has invested most heavily and is most advanced in substitution 
of information technology for conventional inputs (outside of IT itself) is in warfare. 
There are very powerful incentives to develop autonomous and robotic activities 
because of the winner-take-all nature of military technologies and because the 
dangers of war make nations averse to risking lives.  
 The key word in the last paragraph is autonomous. The US Department of 
Defense defined these as “weapon systems that, once activated, can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.” This definition 
suggests the ability of such systems to assess the situational context on a battlefield 
and to decide on the required attack according to pre-programmed rules and 
battlefield information.  
 Some of the key developments in IT warfare are the following. Drone aircraft 
such as the Predator have the capability to identify targets and fire missiles. Daksh is 
a battery-operated remote-controlled robot on wheels that can recover and defuse 
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bombs. Guardium is a small Israeli tank-like surveillance vehicle that operates 
completely autonomously to guard the Gaza border. PackBots are a series of small 
robots used to identify bombs, collect air samples in hazardous sites, and sniff for 
explosives. SWORDS is a small American tank-like vehicle that is remote controlled 
at this time. The Samsung SGR-A1 is a South Korean military robot sentry, armed 
with sensors and a machine gun, that can operate autonomously and is designed to 
replace human counterparts in the demilitarized zone at the South and North Korea 
border. More advanced versions of these are under development. It is possible to 
envision that a rogue nation will develop genetically engineered super-humans to 
fight alongside robots. 
 While the automation of warfare is only in its infancy, we can examine the impact 
to date. The share of compensation in total output for US defense spending has risen 
slightly over the last two decades, so on that test the accelerationist hypothesis is 
not supported. Battle deaths in recent wars (in Iraq and Afghanistan) are down 
sharply from earlier wars (Vietnam and Korea), and this is undoubtedly in part due 
to better information and smart weapons. The success of cyberweapons is (as far as 
we can tell from public sources) minimal, perhaps setting back Iran’s nuclear 
program by a year or so. So the bottom line on the role of IT in military technologies 
is that it has not moved substantially toward replacing human labor. 
f. The complication of evil agents  
 
The discussion up to now has ignored one major specter haunting 
information technology – the presence of increasingly powerful and dangerous 
hacking, cybercrime, and evil agents in cyberspace. The parallel here is to the game-
theoretic dynamics of the development of more powerful weaponry in warfare. 
Even though the innovators (of bows and arrows, machine guns, tanks, and nuclear 
weapons) have an initial advantage over their adversaries, the advantage is 
temporary. Even the most closely held technological secret slowly diffuses around 
the world.  
We must therefore assume that those who develop the engines of 
superintelligence will eventually find they are sharing them with evil agents – with 
their military, commercial, and political adversaries. And as we have learned 
through the Snowden leaks, our own governments are likely to be in the vanguard of 
use and potential abuse of advancing computational powers. The issues concerning 
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the ethics and law of armed conflict with autonomous agents (discussed in the last 
section) have been extensively debated (see for example Singer 2009). 
 
A further complication is this: The development of superintelligence raises a 
new concern not contemplated before in the development of political and military 
spying and weapons. We must be concerned that to the list of adversaries will be 
added the superintelligent machines themselves. If we are to take seriously Good’s 
description above of superintelligence, we must consider that superintelligent 
machines will develop their own ethical systems, laws, sanctions, and governance.  
If we consider how much moral, legal, and economic systems have evolved 
over the last millennium at the slow pace of human thinking, then we would have to 
believe that superintelligent reasoning would evolve many times more rapidly once 
it began to tackle the thorny issues that human struggle with. Just as theologians 
worry whether a powerful God is just by our primitive human standards, we should 
also worry about whether superintelligent machines will be just – or more 
accurately, whether their sense of justice will resemble our own. If they become 
irritated with humans, what will they do? Will the superintelligent treat us as flies to 
wonton boys? 
So the point here is that the approaching Singularity is not one of 
unambiguous economic and social improvement.  This was appreciated by nuclear 
weapons developer John von Neumann (1955): 
 
Useful and harmful techniques lie everywhere so close together that it is 
never possible to separate the lions from the lambs. This is known to all who 
have so laboriously tried to separate secret, classified science or technology 
(military) from the open kind; success is never more nor intended to be more 
than transient, lasting perhaps half a decade. Similarly, a separation into 
useful and harmful subjects in any technological sphere would probably 





XI. Concluding Comments on Singularity 
So the conclusion as of today is that “the Singularity is not near.” This 
conclusion is based on several tests that place the theory of the Singularity within 
the context of economic growth theory. Much of the computer science literature on 
the Singularity examines the growth in specific sectors or processes (such as flops 
or storage), but the economic perspective insists that the growth must be weighted 
by the economic valuation of the good or service.  
The major insight of economics is to emphasize the heterogeneity of both 
inputs and outputs of the economic system. It is surely true that technological 
change in production of raw computation has been phenomenal over the last 
century. We can process information at a speed that is millions of billions times 
faster and cheaper than was possible for the fastest lightning calculators of the 
nineteenth century.  
Suppose that trend continues indefinitely, including the ability to devise ever 
more ingenious software and artificial intelligence (AI). For increasing capabilities 
of computers to lead to the Singularity would require that AI could encompass all 
human activities, not just add numbers, solve equations, play chess, and interpret 
speech; but also lay hands on patients, read bedtime stories to children, and change 
flat tires.  
Whereas computerized AI might do many routine tasks, the non-routine tasks 
are less easily programmed, and they evolve over time in response to the economic 
environment, including the environment of artificial intelligence itself. Particularly if 
we view the world with potential superintelligence as a competition between 
humans and machines, then we definitely would need a team of humans to consider 
how to protect humans from machines. We routinely spend 5% of output on 
defense, and this might rise to a much larger number when faced with a more 
powerful enemies like superintelligent machines. So one occupation at least would 
survive into the Era of Singularity. 
Whether other sectors and tasks would be immune to the rise of 
superintelligence is an open question. The empirical question is the degree of 
substitutability between information and human labor. Given the complexity of both 
humans and jobs, it is unlikely that the question can be decided a priori. The 
analysis above indicates that information and computers will come to dominate the 
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economy only if the information inputs or outputs take a rising share of 
consumption or inputs. This requires that the expenditure shares or input cost 
shares of information rise over time, which in turn requires that the volume of 
expenditures or inputs rise more rapidly than the relative prices fall. We can call 
these the “substitution tests” to be concise. 
There are six tests on the supply side and one test on the demand side. The 
conclusions from the empirical tests proposed here is that the substitution tests fail 
for five of seven tests and succeed for two of the five tests. However, the growth 
trajectories of the variables which pass the test (the share of capital in total income 
and the share of informational capital in total capital) are relatively slow. Projecting 
the trends of the last decade or more, it would be in the order of a century before 
these variables would reach the level associated with the growth Singularity. 
The conclusion is therefore that the growth Singularity is not near. However, 
this conclusion is tentative and is based on economic trends to date. Those who are 
concerned about the coming Singularity can use these tests on an ongoing basis to 
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